The American presence III: The air war

Air power was an important aspect of the American presence in Vietnam. More than half of the $200 billion the United States expended to wage this war went to support air operations. From 1962 through 1973 the US dropped nearly 8 million tons of boms on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; South Vietnam received about half that tonnage, making it the most bombed country in the history of aerial warfare. American forces lost a total of 8,588 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft during that period.

Air power's primary role in Vietnam was support of ground operations, which ran counter to the existing USAF doctrine holding that air power could be better used in the Vietnam War in a strategic air campaign against North Vietnam. Operations outside of South Vietnam included three major air campaigns over North Vietnam, a series of interdiction campaigns along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and various air operations over Cambodia; we will consider only three of these campaigns to provide a feel for the use of air power: Operation Rolling Thunder, Operation Bolo, and Operation Linebacker I & II; note that two of these military operations are also seen elsewhere in the course. Of all the air campaigns conducted outside South Vietnam, only Linebacker I, the air response to North Vietnam's Spring Offensive of 1972, was a complete success. The rest either failed or are subject to conflicting interpretations.

Air power used inside South Vietnam is certainly subject to interpretation. It might be argued, for example, that air power played a strategically counterproduction role in South Vietnam, with images of napalm strikes in villages and of forests denuded by defoliation operations supporting the claims of the antiwar movement. It might also be argued that the ability of US air power to provide support for troops on the ground actually prolonged the war by making it possible for the Army and Marines to stay engaged in a conflict they really did not know how to win.

The Vietnam War, as is the case in many conflicts, drove technological and operational development for air power. Noteworthy technical and tactical developments during this period included aerial defoliation; the development end employment of propeller-driven, side-firing gunships; the use of forward air controllers to coordinate air strikes in South Vietnam and northern Laos; and the introduction of so-called "smart bombs," laser-guided weapons. One of the great success stories was the USAF's development of long-range combat aircrew search-and-rescue (SAR) capability.

It is important to remember that, while occasionally pivotal in one operation or another, especially in supporting ground operations, air power by itself was not a decisive factor in the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, the role of air power remains subject to controversy and myth. Enthusiasts for air powere perpetuate what is more than likely a myth: that if US air forces had been unleashed, quick and decisive victory would have followed; most often cited as proof of this position by these enthusiasts is the "Christmas Bombing" of Linebacker II. On the opposite side of the controversy are some in the antiwar movement who claimed that North Vietnam's cities were carpet bombed and that napalm was used indiscriminately throughout the war, neither of which assertions happen to be true, suggesting either ignorance or shoddy research.

What IS true is that the United States was the first major power in modern times to lose a war in which it controlled the air. Vietnam provided a new truth as well: that winning or losing in warfare is much more than a function of sortie generation and firepower on targets. Winning a war incorporates many factors, including politics, national resolve, geography, time, and weather. Air power alone did not provide the answer.

Readings:

1. Kolko, pp. 188-198
2. Langguth. pp. 593-632

Military Operations:

1. Operation Rolling Thunder
2. Operation Bolo
3. Operation Linebacker

Questions for consideration and further discussion:

1. What might "unleashing" the US air power have entailed?
2. Why do you think the US used air bases outside of Vietnam, in Thailand, during most of the war?
3. Why was so much money (over $100 billion) required to support air power in the Vietnam War?
4. What sort of role does technological development play in the effective use of and cost of an air war?
5. Why does the use of air power appeal to some and seem repulsive to others?