The American presence I: U.S. advisors

While the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) for Indochina was established in 1950, the United States did not become seriously involved in advising and training ARVN until 1955. The 1954 Geneva Accords originally limited the number of U.S. military advisors in Vietnam to 342, but the U.S. found ways around this. By 1961 there were about 900 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. Later that same year U. S. President Kennedy decided to send a much larger number of military advisors to Vietnam. At the time Kennedy began expanding the number of advisors, their roles began to change. Although advisors operated under the pretense that they were there only to train and offer advice, the advisors actually began to be assigned direct combat missions. The U.S. Army Special Forces A-teams commanded and led Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group units; U.S. Air Force pilots flew bombing missions as part of Project Farm Gate in planes with Vietnamese Air Force markings, although they had to have a Vietnamese aboard every plane on every mission to present the illusion of a training mission.

The effectiveness of advisors varied widely. Few of them spoke Vietnamese, which made it difficult for them to communicate or acquire a deep understanding of the Vietnamese organizations they were supposedly advising during what was typically a one-year tour. Vietnam was not the only Southeast Asian country to have a U.S. military presence. Advisors also arrived in Laos in 1959, although the U.S. later pulled them out and replaced them, on a limited scale, with covert advisors operating through the CIA.

American advisors in Vietnam became involved increasingly in ARVN military operations in the early 1960s. The most visible of those operations was the Battle of Ap Bac, occurring in January of 1963. Participation in such operations was frustrating to the Americans, largely because of the politics in Saigon which made many ARVN generals cautious about committing their troops to action.

Readings:

1. Kolko, pp. 111-125.
2. Langguth, pp. 159-196.

 

Military Operations:

Ap Bac

Questions for consideration and further discussion:

1. Is there something unethical about the concept of "advisors" who do more than offer advice?
2. Why did American military officers such as Col. John Paul Vann become frustrated with ARVN?
3. How did American military officers deal with such frustration?
4. Did members of the media help or hinder the advisor situation at the Battle of Ap Bac?
5. Did ARVN win or lose at Ap Bac?